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The Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule and the privileges for confidential communications are two of the most important contemporary evidentiary doctrines. The constitutional rule excluding evidence obtained through illegal searches and seizures attracts more attention than any other exclusionary rule. For example, it is the subject of the famous multivolume work, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment by Professor Wayne R. LaFave. 2 The United States Supreme Court hands down more decisions relating to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule than to either the Fifth or Sixth Amendment rule. 3 Like the Fourth Amendment rule, the doctrine protecting privileged communications has gained prominence. When the Supreme Court submitted the draft of the Federal Rules of Evidence to Congress in 1973, the submission triggered a veritable "crisis" 4 in the rule-making process, straining relations between * Edward L. Barrett, Jr. Professor of Law, University of California Davis; author, THE NEW WIGMORE: EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES (2d ed. 2010) (2 vols.). The author would like to express his thanks to Professor Robert Mosteller of the University of North Carolina School of Law who kindly commented on an earlier draft of this article.
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12. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § § 80, 90, 101 (6th ed. 2006) [hereinafter MCCORMICK]. 13. Id. § 91. 14. FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 2010 -2011 EDITION 252 (2010 [T]he rule that has emerged from prior decisions is that there is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as "reasonable."
24
That passage is now widely regarded as the enunciating test for the scope or reach of the Fourth Amendment. 25 Today it is generally understood that, to establish a Fourth Amendment claim, the accused must demonstrate that the police violated his "reasonable expectation of privacy." 26 Until very recently, while the Fourth Amendment cases employed Justice Harlan's expression of "reasonable expectation of privacy," the privilege cases continued to utilize the traditional terminology of "reasonable expectation of confidentiality." 27 However, within the past few years a new trend has emerged. The trend is that the privilege cases have begun to abandon the traditional terminology and adopt the "reasonable expectation of privacy" expression. 28 This trend is evident in both state and federal decisions.
29
Although this linguistic development is interesting, the far more significant development is that some cases have begun to equate the substantive standards governing the expectation of privacy in privilege law with the expectation of privacy in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 30 A 2009 North Carolina decision, State v. Rollins, 31 is illustrative. That case involved the spousal privilege; the accused confided in his spouse during her visits to him in prison. 32 Under the circumstances, the accused took all the precautions he could to ensure that no one overheard the content of the 24. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) However, a long line of post-Katz Fourth Amendment authority has held that the accused lacks a constitutionally protected expectation in public areas, such as train station waiting areas and the parking lots or visiting areas of prisons. 34 The Rollins court seemingly looked to those authorities and decided that the spousal privilege did not attach to the accused's conversations with his wife in the prison visiting area. In a well-reasoned article, Professors Mosteller and Broun sharply criticized the Rollins decision. 35 The purpose of this Article is to elaborate on the differences between expectation of confidentiality in privilege law and expectation of privacy in Fourth Amendment doctrine. The first part of this Article sketches some of the general differences between communications, privileges, and the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule. Given those differences, the second part of this Article focuses on the specific distinctions between the concept of an expectation of confidentiality in privilege and an expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment. The third and final part of this Article identifies some of the untoward consequences that may result if the courts lose sight of those distinctions. To minimize the risk of confusion, this Article calls on the courts to revert to traditional terminology in privilege cases and refrain from using the confusingly similar Fourth Amendment expression "expectation of privacy."
I. THE GENERAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE FOURTH AMENDMENT EXCLUSIONARY RULE AND THE PRIVILEGE PROTECTION FOR CONFIDENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS
The distinctions between the confidentiality expectation in privilege law and the privacy expectation under the Fourth Amendment can be more easily appreciated if they are viewed against the backdrop of the essential differences between privilege law and the protection afforded by the exclusionary rule.
A. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT EXCLUSIONARY RULE
The Fourth Amendment reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 33. Mosteller & Broun, supra note 30, 
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Loyola Law Review [Vol. 57 place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
36
The Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule applies when the police violate the mandate of the Fourth Amendment. 37 However, the scope of the Fourth Amendment is quite narrow. The amendment is not a sweeping guarantee of privacy rights. Rather, the constitutional text reveals that the amendment provides only qualified protection for certain types of potential evidence from government intrusion.
The protection is qualified or conditional in nature. The warrant provision indicates that the personal rights it confers can be balanced against societal needs. Suppose, for example, that at a suppression hearing the trial judge initially finds that the accused had a reasonable expectation of privacy in a certain communication intercepted by police. That finding does not dictate the conclusion that the judge must grant the motion to suppress. Add the facts that, before the interception, the police complied with Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, 38 made a showing of probable cause, and obtained judicial authorization for the monitoring that resulted in the interception. Given these additional facts, there was no Fourth Amendment violation, and the judge should deny the motion. In short, the accused's Fourth Amendment rights can be overridden by a case-specific showing of need justifying the issuance of the warrant or judicial authorization.
Just as the nature of the protection is qualified, the protected types of potential evidence are limited. By its terms, the Fourth Amendment applies only to searches or seizures of an individual's "persons, houses, papers, and effects."
39 If the conduct in question does not impinge on one of the listed, protected evidentiary sources, the conduct cannot run afoul of the Fourth Amendment.
Lastly, even when the conduct intrudes on one of the enumerated potential sources of evidence, the Fourth Amendment affords protection only against government intrusions. The Fourth Amendment is part of the historic Bill of Rights, conceived and adopted as a set of essential limitations on governmental power. 40 The vast majority of cases implicate the exclusionary rule in the context of a criminal prosecution, in which the accused resorts to the rule as a basis for excluding evidence gathered by 36. U.S. Const. amend. IV. 37. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 648 (1961 Grice, 37 F. Supp. 2d 428, 432 n.13 (D.S.C. 1998) . Wigmore attempted to reconcile two policy considerations, the promotion of important social relations, such as attorney and client and the legal system's priority on rectitude of decision. In part, he did so by extending privileges only to relationships in which the protection of confidentiality is truly "essential." WIGMORE, supra note 8, § 2285, at 527. The assumption was that confidentiality was essential in the sense that the typical layperson would be unwilling to confide in an attorney, spouse, or therapist without the assurance of confidentiality provided by an evidentiary privilege. Melanie B. Leslie, The Costs of Confidentiality and the Purpose of Privilege, 1 WIS. L. REV. 31, 31 (2000) . The layperson would presumably balk at making a revelation unless, at the very time of the communication, he or she could predict that a court would not later compel disclosure of the communication. The layperson could do so if any exceptions to the privilege were announced beforehand and stated in bright line terms. However, the layperson would be unable to make that confident prediction if a court could surmount the privilege after the fact on the basis of a showing of compelling need for the privileged information. In Wigmore's paradigm, privileges therefore had to be absolute in the sense that they cannot be surmounted in that manner. 
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The paramount criterion is Wigmore's requirement that "confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties." 54 In other words, the advocate for the recognition of a privilege must demonstrate that absent a privilege, the typical similarly situated person-the client, the patient, or spouse-would be deterred from either consulting the third party or making necessary disclosures during the consultation.
55
Without a privilege, the average person would "hold . . . back." 56 Basically, the privilege must be a necessary incentive 57 for the average person contemplating a communication with that type of confidant. If it were not for the existence of the privilege, the typical person would not consult or confide. 58 On this assumption, the recognition of evidentiary privileges comes cost-free to the judicial system. 59 It is true that in the microcosm, when a judge enforces a privilege, the judge is excluding relevant evidence that could assist the trier of fact. However, according to Wigmore's theory, the excluded evidence would not have come into existence without the privilege. 60 layperson will not consult or confide unless, at the very time he decides whether to reveal, he can confidently predict whether a court will later protect his revelation from compelled disclosure. 62 If a court could later surmount the privilege on the basis of an ad hoc showing of need for the information, the layperson would be unable to make the necessary prediction. The advance announcement of an exception, such as the crime/fraud doctrine, is not inconsistent with the layperson's ability to predict whether he will be protected against compelled judicial disclosure; so long as the court or legislature announces the exception beforehand, the layperson can factor the existence of the exception into his decision. However, the possibility that a judge could subsequently deny the privilege on the basis of a case-specific showing of need for the privileged information would undermine the layperson's ability. In sum, positing Wigmore's assumption about laypersons' reluctance to disclose absent a privilege, it is understandable that he insisted that privileges be classified as absolute.
Although privileges are more absolute than the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, in another respect privileges are much narrower in scope. As previously stated, the Fourth Amendment guarantee applies to an array of potential sources of evidence: individuals' "houses, persons, papers, and effects." 63 For that matter, the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule shields both the enumerated sources and evidence derived from illegal searches or seizures. 64 The rule extends to both the immediate products of the illegal search or seizure and the fruit of the poisonous tree." 65 The reach of the Fourth Amendment rule is much wider than that of a common-law or statutory privilege. Most privileges protect only communications between the persons standing in the privileged relationship.
66 A privilege could protect an accused's communication to his or her attorney about the location of an item of inculpatory physical evidence; but, unlike the Fourth Amendment, it does not bar evidence of the subsequent police seizure of the item of evidence.
Even if the attorney improperly disclosed the communication to the police and the police used the communication as an investigative tool to locate the item of evidence, the accused could not rely In another respect, though, the protective ambit of privileges is much broader than that of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule. As previously mentioned, a citizen may enforce his or her Fourth Amendment rights only against the government in a prosecution or government actors under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The exclusionary rule does not prevent a private citizen litigant from using the fruits of the illegal search or seizure as evidence in a civil lawsuit between that citizen and the victim of the illegal intrusion.
68
In contrast, a privilege holder may assert that evidentiary doctrine against any type of opposing litigant. Ohio Rule of Evidence 101(B) states that a privilege holder may invoke the privilege against the opposition in "all actions, cases, and proceedings . . . ." 69 The privilege provisions of the California Evidence Code purport to apply the various privileges in any "proceeding," and, in turn, Evidence Code § 901 defines "proceeding" in the following fashion:
"Proceeding" means any action, hearing, investigation, inquest, or inquiry (whether conducted by a court, administrative agency, hearing officer, arbitrator, legislative body, or any other person authorized by law) in which, pursuant to law, testimony can be compelled to be given.
70
The breadth of the privileges' applicability is understandable in light of Wigmore's paradigm. Again, Wigmore reasoned that the fear of disclosure would deter the typical client, patient, or spouse from consulting or 67 confiding. The fact of possible disclosure generates the deterrence, and it does not matter where the disclosure occurs. So long as the disclosure occurred in a public setting-a criminal case, a civil lawsuit, or an administrative hearing-it could frighten the layperson into refraining from consultation or revelation.
II. THE FUNDAMENTAL DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN THE EXPECTATION OF CONFIDENTIALITY IN PRIVILEGE LAW AND THE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
As demonstrated, numerous courts have used the same language of "reasonable expectation of privacy," to describe the required state of mind of the claimant invoking both the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule and the communication privileges.
71 However, as Part I explained, there are major differences between the nature of such privileges and the exclusionary rule. In light of those differences, it should come as no surprise that on close scrutiny, the required states of mind turn out to be quite dissimilar. They differ in three important respects: the timing, the nature, and the reasonableness of the expectation.
A. THE TIME WHEN THE REQUIRED EXPECTATION MUST EXIST
The person must possess an expectation. At what point in time, though, must the person have that expectation in mind?
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT EXCLUSIONARY RULE.
The Fourth Amendment protection is applicable only if the person had the required reasonable expectation of privacy at the time of the government's intrusion into his or her privacy. 72 Suppose that in a prosecution under Chapter 40 of Title 18 of the United States Code, the government has charged the accused with illegal manufacture of an explosive device. 73 The accused does not have a scientific background, but the government contends that he purchased a text on bomb-making and learned how to make explosive devices by studying the text.
A year earlier the accused purchased the text at a local bookstore. He did so in plain view of several customers who happened to be in the store at the time. When the accused stepped to the counter to make the purchase, he made no effort to hide his face or the title of the text he was buying. After 
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buying the text, he walked home; and as he walked, he held the book in one arm-with its title exposed to anyone who happened to pass him on the street. However, when the government begins to investigate the accused, they encounter obstacles. Although the bookstore employee remembers seeing the accused in the store, he cannot recall the title of the text the accused purchased. Moreover, since the accused paid cash for the text, there is no credit card slip tying his credit card to the purchase of that specific text. Finally, while the government has found a witness who saw the accused en route from the bookstore to his apartment, the witness cannot recall whether the accused was holding a book, much less the title of the book. Consequently, to prove that the accused had access to the book, the government conducts a search of the accused's apartment, finds the text on a shelf, and seizes it as potential evidence.
When the accused initially purchased the text and transported it to his apartment, the accused made no attempt to hide either his identity or the title of the text. The accused nonchalantly exposed the title of the text to public view. Anyone who happened to be nearby-including an Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) agent-could have seen the title. However, unfortunately for the prosecution, the government cannot locate any witnesses who saw the accused, noticed the book, and remembered the title. 75 If the government lacked probable cause and neglected to obtain a search warrant, both the search of the apartment and the seizure of the book are illegal. At the time of the search, the book was on a shelf in the accused's apartment; at that time, the accused had not knowingly exposed the book to public view, including the gaze of law enforcement agents. It is immaterial that the accused had earlier exposed the book to plain view by members of the public. The dispositive time is the time of the intrusion.
COMMUNICATIONS PRIVILEGES
The protection of a communications privilege is applicable only if the person had the required expectation of confidentiality at the very time of the communication.
76
Assume that a businesswoman is negotiating a new Although the three other persons at the table are passing acquaintances of the businesswoman, she has no privileged relationship with them; none of them is her attorney, therapist, or spouse. During the conversation, she tells her attorney that she has a certain understanding of a royalty provision in the licensing contract she is negotiating. Later the next day, she makes a note of her conversation with the attorney about the provision in the journal she keeps in plain view on her office desk. She subsequently signs the contract, and the final contract includes the royalty provision that she had mentioned to her attorney during the dinner conversation that night.
At a later point in time, a dispute arises over the meaning of the wording of the royalty provision.
77 She fears that the other party to the contract is contemplating suing her; and she realizes that in any lawsuit over the interpretation of the provision, her statement to her attorney could be damaging evidence against her current position over the proper construction of the contract clause. She consequently removes the journal from plain view in her office and places it in her safe. She is the only person who knows the combination to the safe. She later directs her attorney not to mention their dinner conversation to anyone. Later her fear is realized. The other party brings suit, and during pretrial discovery, the party files a motion for an order requiring the businesswoman to produce the journal containing the entry about her conversation with her attorney.
By the time of the attempted intrusion-the plaintiff's production motion-the businesswoman had done everything in her power to shield the conversation and the journal from public view and to keep their contents secret. If her prior conversation with her attorney was privileged, the privilege might extend to the journal entry. There is authority that the privilege extends to both a client's notes of a privileged conversation 78 and the attorney's memorials of such conversations. 
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The Dangerous Trend 15 production motion, the businesswoman certainly intends to maintain the secrecy of the contents of the journal entry. If, as is true under the Fourth Amendment, the controlling time were the time of the attempted intrusion, the judge ought to sustain her privilege claim and deny the production motion.
However, here the critical time is the time of the communication itself. If, at that time, the businesswoman did not intend that her statement to her attorney was confidential, the privilege would not attach. 80 At the dinner, there were three persons within earshot of the conversation, and the businesswoman did not whisper to prevent them from overhearing its content. Consequently, the privilege never attached, even though she is now zealously attempting to guard the secrecy of the journal's contents. The judge should reject her privilege claim and grant the production motion. The timing requirement for the privilege is thus radically different than the timing requirement for the exclusionary rule.
B. THE NATURE OF THE BELIEF(S) CONSTITUTING THE EXPECTATION
Again, the person must possess an "expectation." But what is the substantive content of the expectation? More specifically, what beliefs comprise that expectation? Under both the exclusionary rule and the privileges doctrine, the claimant must have a certain subjective belief. In his concurrence in Katz, Justice Harlan referred to "an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy . . . ."
81 Similarly, to make out a prima facie case for a privilege claim, the asserted holder must establish that he entertained a subjective expectation of confidentiality. In Dean Wigmore's words, the allegedly privileged communications "must [have] client is actually "aware" that a third party outside the privileged relationship is present. 83 Although both the privacy expectation and the confidentiality expectation are subjective beliefs, the nature of the beliefs is fundamentally different.
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT EXCLUSIONARY RULE
In the Fourth Amendment context, the required subjective belief is a rather simple state of mind. The claimant must demonstrate that just prior to the time of the intrusion, he believed that the protected potential evidence source-for example, the house, paper, or effect-was not exposed to public gaze, including the view of government officials. 84 The There the Court sustained aerial surveillance of the accused's fenced backyard. 95 He noted that the Ciraolo Court had reasoned that "'[a]ny member of the public flying in this airspace who glanced down could have seen anything these officers observed. '" 96 In his treatise, Professor LaFave reviews these Supreme Court precedents.
97 At the conclusion of the review, he cites a comment made by a perceptive commentator.
98
He approvingly quotes the commentator's assertion that a person enjoys no Fourth Amendment protection for an object or activity if the person has "knowingly expose [d] them to the open view of the public."
99 When the person knows that he has left the potential evidentiary source exposed to the general public, the person lacks the expectation necessary to support a Fourth Amendment claim.
COMMUNICATIONS PRIVILEGES
As explained above, the privacy expectation required of a Fourth Amendment claimant is a belief that he has not knowingly exposed the object or activity to members of the general public. The confidentiality expectation required of a privilege claimant is quite different. It is both more complex and different in focus. Although the courts often refer to an expectation of confidentiality in the singular, as if it were a single belief, in truth this expectation consists of a set of three distinct beliefs. The first essential belief is that the listener with whom the layperson is speaking qualifies as a confidant. There is no general privilege for communications between friends, 100 siblings, or, in most jurisdictions, parent and child. 101 The vast majority of jurisdictions have limited the privilege to communications with persons in essentially fiduciary relationships such as spouses, 102 attorneys and their clients, 103 and physicians and their patients. 104 A layperson is entitled to the assurance of confidentiality furnished by a communications privilege only if, at the time of the communication, the person believes he is communicating with a confidant falling into one of these categories. 105 The second requirement is that the layperson believes he is making the revelation only to the confidant. As a general proposition, 106 if the layperson knows 107 that someone other than the confidant is both present and close enough to overhear the revelation, the privilege does not attach. 108 In that event, any person who heard the statement-the layperson, the confidant, or the third party-could be compelled to disclose the contents of the statement.
The third belief the layperson must entertain is the expectation that the confidant will maintain the secrecy of the information in the future. Suppose that the client speaks solely to the attorney confidant but authorizes the attorney to disclose the communication to a third party outside the circle of confidence. 517, 520 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996 ) (involving a situation in which the client told the attorney to inform the contractor that the client was terminating the construction contract); Hoeschst Celanese Corp. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 623 A.2d 1118 , 1122 (Del. Super. Ct. 1992 ) ("When the client makes a communication with the intention or expectation that it will be revealed to another person, who is not necessary for the rendition of the legal services or communication, this element of confidentiality is lacking." (citations omitted)); Crystal Cubes of Stone Mountain, Inc. v. Kutz, 411 S.E.2d 53, 55 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991) (involving a situation in which the client gave the attorney an affidavit to use in settlement negotiations with the other side); see also It is not enough that the layperson believes that, at the time of the communication, he is divulging information to the confidant and the confidant alone; in addition, the totality of the circumstances must lead the layperson to have confidence that in the future the confidant will maintain the secrecy of the divulgence.
In privilege law, the "expectation" of privacy consists of this set of three beliefs. If the layperson lacks any of the three beliefs, then he does not have the required expectation, and no privilege will come into play to shield the communication.
C. THE STANDARD FOR ASSESSING THE REASONABLENESS OF THE EXPECTATION
Both privilege law and Fourth Amendment jurisprudence refer to a "reasonable" expectation. However, reasonableness must be judged from some perspective. Does the same perspective govern in both bodies of law? Just as Justice Harlan's concurrence in Katz required that a Fourth Amendment claimant's expectation be reasonable, 117 many courts insist that a privilege claimant demonstrate the reasonableness of his or her expectation.
118
However, any analyst with a modicum of legal sophistication realizes that, in different contexts, the same word can carry different meanings. Admittedly, the use of the word "reasonableness" indicates that, in both settings, the judge must employ some sort of objective standard; standing alone, the claimant's proof of a subjective expectation is insufficient to support the claim. However, the question arises: should the courts assess the reasonableness of the belief from the same perspective under both the Fourth Amendment and privilege doctrine?
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT EXCLUSIONARY RULE
In this setting, the most sensible interpretation of "reasonable" is that even when the claimant entertains the required subjective expectation, the judge must decide whether that expectation is acceptable from a broad 119 social perspective. The analysis does not adopt the narrow perspective of the claimant or even a hypothetical, similarly situated person. Rather, the focus should be on the societal norms governing limitations on police 
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The Dangerous Trend 21 activity. 120 In Katz, Justice Harlan did not refer to a reasonable expectation; rather, he alluded to "an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy . . . that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable."
121 The text of the Fourth Amendment cuts in favor of the same interpretation. The Fourth Amendment does not mention expectation, much less reasonable expectation. Instead, the constitutional language is "unreasonable searches and seizures."
122 The text strongly suggests that even after finding that the claimant entertained the requisite subjective belief, the judge must inquire further whether, given the pertinent social norms, 123 the Fourth Amendment ought to protect citizens against this type of intrusion. In society's judgment, is this type or category of police activity in question an important tool for controlling crime?
124 The test is a legal one rather than a factual one;
125 the decision turns on a value judgment, 126 not a determination of fact. Under this interpretation, the outcome is determined by categorical policy judgments 127 about societal constraints on law enforcement activity.
COMMUNICATIONS PRIVILEGES
When the analysis shifts from the Fourth Amendment to the doctrinal area of privilege, reasonableness takes on a quite different meaning. In this setting, the perspective is the narrower one of a hypothetical, reasonable person. The reasonableness must be gauged from the point of view of the person making the communication. The claimant's belief must be factually reasonable.
128
The issue is whether, given the specific circumstances surrounding the communication, the claimant's belief in present and future confidentiality was objectively warranted.
129 Ultimately, the question is factual in nature, 130 depending on the particular circumstances facing the claimant at the time he decides to communicate. Under this interpretation, the precautions the claimant takes to secure present and future 120. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984) 131 If the layperson and the confidant were speaking in a room, did the layperson check to ensure that the door to the room was completely closed to make it improbable that a passerby could overhear their conversation? Did the layperson explicitly instruct the confidant not to disclose the communication to any third parties without the layperson's consent? Would the circumstances, including the precautions taken, convince a hypothetical reasonable person in the claimant's position that it was justified to believe in present and future confidentiality?
III. THE DANGERS POSED BY THE INCIPIENT JUDICIAL TREND TO CONFUSE THE TWO EXPECTATIONS
The introduction noted that, in a growing number of privilege cases, the courts are borrowing the expression "expectation of privacy" from Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and that some courts are even equating some of the substantive standards in the two bodies of law.
132 These trends are dangerous. These tendencies can result in serious doctrinal distortions in both bodies of law. In some cases, the distortions can take the form of unsound curtailments of Fourth Amendment and privilege protection while, in other cases, the tendencies could lead to unjustifiable extensions of the doctrines.
A. CURTAILMENTS OF PROTECTION
As noted in Part II.A., while the Fourth Amendment expectation must exist at the time of the government intrusion, 133 the privilege expectation must exist at the time of the communication.
134
Suppose that a court confused the timing requirements in a Fourth Amendment case. Assume, for instance, that a client wanted to contact his attorney. The client decides to telephone the attorney; at the time that the client places the call, the client is in his conference room with a business associate who is an employee of another company. The attorney is not in her office at the time of the call, and the client therefore leaves a voicemail message. When the client left the message, he spoke in a normal volume; and the business associate was standing within easy earshot. In a later prosecution of the client, the government suspects that the voicemail message could supply incriminating information. Unfortunately for the government, the business associate is either unavailable or cannot recall the content of the client's message. Consequently, the government seizes the attorney's voicemail records. The 
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The client and attorney respond by joining to move to suppress the records under the Fourth Amendment. If the government persuaded the judge to focus on the time of the client's statement, as would be appropriate under privilege law, the judge might mistakenly deny the motion. At that time, the client did not exhibit an expectation of privacy; the client knew that a third party was present and close enough to hear the content of the message left for the attorney. However, in the instant case, the objection is not premised on the attorney-client privilege; rather, the objection rests on the Fourth Amendment. For Fourth Amendment purposes, the critical time is the time of the government intrusion. If, without a warrant, the government agents entered the attorney's interior personal office, 135 the entry would be the search of a "house[]," and the acquisition of the records would be the functional equivalent of a seizure of "papers."
136 Hence, the motion should be granted.
Just as a facile, generalized equation of the Fourth Amendment and the communication privileges might lead to a contraction of Fourth Amendment protection in some cases, in other situations the mistake could undermine the protection afforded by privilege doctrine. Part II.C. pointed out the difference between the meaning of reasonable in the constitutional setting and its meaning in privilege law. In the latter, the claimant must have a factually reasonable belief in present and future confidentiality; given the circumstances, a hypothetical, reasonable person would have thought it probable that only the confidant heard the person's communication and that the confidant would maintain the confidentiality in the future. 137 In contrast, in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, reasonable denotes a societal judgment that the citizen should be protected from this type of government intrusion. When the government subsequently attempted to introduce evidence of the revelations against him at trial, the accused objected on the basis of the spousal privilege, not the Fourth Amendment; but the court overruled the objection. 143 In doing so, the court stressed that the location of the conversation was a public place. It is well settled that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to evidence seized by the police from certain areas such as public places and open fields.
As previously stated, before Katz, the scope of the Fourth Amendment was closely tied to property law. 144 Thus, even if the government used a mechanical device to interpret an accused's communication, there was no Fourth Amendment violation unless the government agents violated the accused's property rights by, for example, committing a trespass onto the accused's real property. While Katz relaxed the sway of property law over the coverage of the Fourth Amendment, the situs of the government intrusion is still an influential factor in deciding whether there has been an unconstitutional search. 145 Thus, many post-Katz cases have refused to find a Fourth Amendment violation when the police intercepted the accused's communication in public areas such as a jail cell, a jail waiting room, or a prison visiting area 146 -the site of the communication in Rollins. In doing so, the courts stress the legitimate, weighty social concern about maintaining security in jails and prisons. 147 In effect, Rollins incorporated this limitation, recognized in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, into the spousal privilege.
The Rollins court's fundamental mistake is its confusion over the meaning of reasonable. In the Fourth Amendment setting, the courts have reasoned that from a broad social perspective, it is unreasonable for persons to expect privacy in these public areas. The courts have concluded that the public interest in preventing and prosecuting crime justifies police surveillance in these areas. Society will not tolerate such warrantless intrusions into citizens' residences or the residences' curtilage. 148 Absent judicial authorization, intrusions into those intensely private areas are too reminiscent of the British practices that, in part, prompted both the
The Dangerous Trend 25 revolution and the subsequent adoption of the Fourth Amendment. 149 The privacy interest in areas other than habitations and their curtilage is much less intense.
However, reasonableness has a different meaning in privilege law. In that setting, the question is whether, given all the surrounding circumstances, including the precautions taken by the claimant, a hypothetical, reasonable person would probably have believed that he had achieved present confidentiality and that the confidant would preserve the confidentiality in the future. 150 In Rollins, there was no one within obvious earshot at the time of the accused's conversation with his wife, the accused spoke softly to maximize the probability that no one would overhear, and the government had not put the accused on notice that conversations in the visiting area would be overheard or recorded. Judged from the perspective of the hypothetical, reasonable person, Rollins' beliefs were factually reasonable. The upshot is that as a result of the court's confusion over the meaning of reasonable in privilege law, the court denied Rollins the privilege protection to which he was rightfully entitled.
B. EXTENSIONS OF UNWARRANTED PROTECTION
The courts' mistaken equation of the required expectations in these two doctrinal areas is a double-edged sword. Subpart A explained that the confusion can contract the proper scope of protection under both the exclusionary rule and communications privileges. In other cases, though, the confusion could conceivably lead the court astray into granting undeserved protection. Subpart II.B. identified the differences between the nature of the beliefs that constitute the expectation under the exclusionary rule and in privilege law. As that subpart pointed out, the essence of the belief required of Fourth Amendment claimants is that the claimant has not left the potential evidentiary source, such as the paper or effect, openly exposed to public view, including the gaze of government authorities.
151
The expectation required of privilege claimants differs markedly. A privilege claimant must entertain the belief that he is communicating with a confidant-and only a confidant.
152 It is not enough for a privilege claimant to have the negative belief, however reasonable, that the contents of the communication are not being exposed to the general public. A privilege claimant must have the affirmative belief that the person with whom they If the courts were to lose sight of that distinction, the consequences could be a significant expansion of the obstructive impact of privileges on the search for truth in litigation. In many respects, privilege protection sweeps far more broadly than that of the exclusionary rule. As discussed previously, although the Fourth Amendment can be asserted only against a government in a prosecution or government actors in civil rights actions, 153 privileges may be invoked in litigation against private parties. For example, in such litigation a holder may assert a privilege as a basis for refusing to permit pretrial discovery; the judge may not impose sanctions for the refusal. 154 Moreover, unlike Fourth Amendment rights, a privilege may be asserted by the holder even when he is not formally joined as party to the litigation. Albeit a non-party, a holder may intervene in a case for the very purpose of asserting the privilege. 155 As an intervenor, the holder does not have to prove any stake in the case other than his interest in protecting their privilege. Finally, as stated previously, unlike qualified Fourth Amendment protection that can be trumped by a warrant based on probable cause, privilege protection is absolute. 156 No matter how desperate the opponent's need for the privileged information or how grave the risk that the suppression of the information will cause a miscarriage of substantive justice, the judge cannot override the privilege. 157 Conflating the Fourth Amendment's privacy expectation with privilege law's confidentiality expectation could thus have severe consequences for the justice system.
In the near future, this may become a pressing issue. Recent years have witnessed a spate of cases addressing the legal issues posed by the use of electronic means of communication by private and public employees.
158
Many employees use their employers' electronic communication devices for personal reasons, including communications with confidants such as attorneys, therapists, and spouses. A growing number of public and private employers have adopted policies and practices regulating such communications. 159 Some employers have issued formal policy statements in codes of conduct and employee handbooks. 160 Such policies are now commonplace in both the public 161 and private 162 sector. These policies have forbidden the use of employer-owned communication devices for personal purposes and announce that the employer may access and review the communications at any time. 163 Significantly, some of these policies state that the employee has no expectation of privacy in such communications. 164 Furthermore, even when they are analyzing the application of privileges-rather than the Fourth Amendment-to such communications, courts have begun to couch their analysis in terms of whether the employee has a protected expectation of privacy. 165 If the employee knows that the employer's computer security measures are adequate to deny outsiders, such as government investigators, access to the files containing the employee's communications, the employee might well have the privacy expectation needed to sustain a Fourth Amendment claim. However, given the employer's access to the files, it is by no means a foregone conclusion that the employee also has the confidentiality expectation required to uphold a privilege claim. Loyola Law Review [Vol. 57
IV. CONCLUSION
There is a growing trend in privilege cases of courts using the expression "expectation of privacy," coined in Katz, to describe the state of mind that a privilege claimant must prove. This development was probably expected. There are numerous consistencies between the two doctrinal areas, 166 and in many respects the doctrines closely align. 167 Again, in a given case with the right facts, both the exclusionary rule and a privilege can come into play; and each will require the suppression of the same item of evidence.
On reflection, though, the judicial tendency to employ an expectation of privacy in privilege cases is a dangerous one. Part I observed that despite the several similarities between the two doctrines, fundamental differences exist. Even more significantly, Part II demonstrated that on close scrutiny, there are major differences between the Fourth Amendment privacy expectation and the privilege law confidentiality expectation: they relate to different points in time, 168 they consist of different beliefs, 169 and they must be reasonable in different senses of that term. 170 The use of the expectation of privacy expression in privilege cases creates a grave risk that, as in Rollins, a court will inadvertently elide from correct analysis in one doctrinal area into flawed reasoning in the other.
171
"A reasonable expectation of privacy" under the Fourth Amendment is not interchangeable with "a reasonable expectation of confidentiality" in privilege law. The twain should not meet-either linguistically or substantively. Simply stated, even cognate concepts should not be confused. 
